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ABSTRACT 
 
The American Law Institute recently revised the Model Penal 
Code’s sentencing provisions, calling for a renewed commitment 
to proportionality based on the gravity of offenses, the 
“blameworthiness” of offenders, and the “harms done to crime 
victims.”  Already, detractors have criticized this move, arguing 
that it replaces the Code’s original commitment to rehabilitation 
with a more punitive attention to retribution.  Yet, missing from 
such calumny is an awareness of retribution’s subtle yet significant 
role in both the drafting and enactment of the first Model Penal 
Code (MPC).  This article recovers that role by focusing on the 
retributive views of its first Reporter, Columbia Law Professor 
Herbert Wechsler.  Though a dedicated utilitarian, Wechsler 
became increasingly aware of retribution’s value to sentencing 
over the course of his career, using that awareness to guide both 
the development and adoption of the MPC.  Recovering his view 
helps us to contextualize and perhaps even better appreciate the 
current revision’s emphasis on proportionality. 
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction ………………………………………………………1 
From New York to Nuremburg: The Formative Years …………..4 
Popular Consensus & the Model Penal Code …………………...17 
Reforming New York’s Penal Law ………………………….…..25 
Revenge Returns to New York ………………………………….39 
Conclusion ………………………………………………...…….42
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356946
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
AMERICAN ORESTEIA 
HERBERT WECHSLER, THE MODEL PENAL CODE, & THE USES OF 
REVENGE 
 
 
 
ANDERS WALKER♦ 
 
 
 
 
But [the Furies] have their destiny too, hard to dismiss, and if they 
fail to win their day in court – how it will spread, the venom of 
their pride.1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 With over two million people in prison and costs of 
incarceration eroding state budgets, sentencing policy is rapidly 
becoming a matter of urgent concern in the United States.2  To 
address such concern, the American Law Institute recently revised 
the Model Penal Code’s sentencing provisions, calling for a 
renewed commitment to proportionality based on the gravity of 
offenses, the “blameworthiness” of offenders, and the “harms done 
to crime victims.”3   Already, detractors have criticized this move, 
arguing that it replaces the Code’s original commitment to 
                                                 
♦
 Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, Ph.D. Yale 
University 2003; J.D. Duke University, 1998; B.A. Wesleyan University, 1994.  
I would like to thank Christopher Slobogin, Eric Miller, and Camille Nelson for 
comments and suggestions.  I would also like to thank Richard J. Bartlett, one of 
the original members of New York’s Commission to revise its Penal Code for 
personal recollections, as well as David Badertscher, Principal Law Librarian at 
the Criminal Law Library, 1st Judicial Circuit, New York, New York for archival 
assistance.  Further credit goes to the New York University School of Law Legal 
History Colloquium, the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford University, 
and the Saint Louis University Faculty Workshop series for hosting 
presentations of earlier drafts of this article. 
1
 AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA 252 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books, 1984). 
2
 See e.g. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 1000: BEHIND BARS IN 
AMERICA (2008).  
3
 The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Tentative Draft 
No. 1, Part I. General Provisions (April 9, 2007), 1 [hereinafter MPC 2007 
Draft]. 
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rehabilitation with a more punitive attention to retribution.4  Yet, 
missing from such calumny is an awareness of retribution’s subtle 
yet significant role in both the drafting and enactment of the first 
Model Penal Code (MPC).5  This article recovers that role by 
focusing on the retributive views of its first Reporter, Columbia 
Law Professor Herbert Wechsler.  Though a dedicated utilitarian, 
Wechsler became increasingly aware of retribution’s value to 
sentencing over the course of his career, using that awareness to 
guide both the development and adoption of the MPC.6  
Recovering his view helps us to contextualize and perhaps even 
better appreciate the current revision’s emphasis on 
proportionality.  
 Retrieving Wechsler’s retributive vision also helps us 
reassess a central problem in modern sentencing policy, namely 
how to constructively reconcile popular demands for retribution 
with rational reform.7  Stung by the xenophobic prejudice of 
Prohibition, Wechsler remained alert to the constitutive role that 
criminal punishment plays in democratic societies, not just as a 
modality for preventing crime but also as a bulwark of social 
cohesion.  While aspects of such thinking paralleled the work of 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 85, 88 (2003); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 17 (2003).  Perhaps the most vehement opponent of the ALI’s commitment 
to retribution, or proportionality, is Judge Michael H. Marcus.  See, e.g. Michael 
H. Marcus, Letter to Professor Reitz, October 4, 2003, available at 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/ homepages/SMMarcus/LttrToProfReitz10-
03.pdf.  Markus Dubber, perhaps the foremost explicator of the Model Penal 
Code, denies retribution any significant role in the MPC, arguing that any effort 
to read retribution into the MPC is an exercise in “futility.”  See e.g. MARKUS D. 
DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 24 (2002).  
5
 See e.g. Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum, The American 
Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Tentative Draft No. 1, (April 9, 
2007), xxviii.  Scholars who have discussed the history of the MPC have tended 
to emphasize its treatmentist side.  See e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal 
Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
53 (2000); Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code’s Historical Antecedents, 
19 RUTGERS L.J. 521 (1988).  
6
 Markus Dubber notes that Wechsler “subscribed” to the “orthodoxy” of 
“treatmentism.”  DUBBER, CODE, supra note 4 at 11.  For one example of 
Wechsler’s interest in retribution, or the public’s “demand for heavy sanctions.” 
see Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 
U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1961).  
7
 See e.g. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The 
Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 
(2005); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code 
Second Save the State from Themselves? 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 (2003); Sara 
Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It?  The Political Social Psychological 
and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) 
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).   
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Nineteenth Century sociologist Emile Durkheim, Wechsler’s 
insights hewed even more closely to an earlier model, the ancient 
Greek tragedy The Oresteia.8  In that play, Orestes kills his mother 
Clytemnestra to avenge the murder of his father, Agamemnon, 
only to then be pursued by the Furies of Revenge, or Erinyes, who 
demand his blood.  As the Erinyes close in on their prey, Athena 
intervenes, replacing blood vengeance with judicial process.  Yet, 
even though Athena’s reform is a step forward, effectively 
replacing the old system of vendetta with jury trial, she still 
requires that the citizens of Athens pay the Furies tribute, renaming 
them the Eumenides, or kindly ones.  
 Like Athena, Herbert Wechsler also recognized that the 
furies of revenge, though they may have no positive impact on 
offenders or crime control, had to be paid deference.  “[T]he desire 
for revenge,” wrote Wechsler in 1940, is “entrenched in the 
general population” and cannot be ignored.9  When electoral 
majorities opposed reform, argued Wechsler, it was the duty of 
liberal-minded policy-makers to persuade the public, through 
education, that change was good.  When this failed and “public 
demand for heavy sanctions” became “inexorable,” Wechsler 
argued that voters should be accommodated – even indulged – lest 
they spark legislative backlash.10  
 While the problem of backlash has become prominent in 
recent literature on civil rights, it has not factored largely in 
criminal law.11  Instead, criminal law scholars have tended to 
deride the political process, arguing that it is “pathological” and 
has resulted in the “degeneration” of criminal codes.12  To 
ameliorate this, prominent scholars have argued against 
democracy, calling for the abolition of “legislative supremacy,” the 
surrender of criminal law creation to courts, and the creation of 
standing commissions insulated from popular vote.13    
 Rather than decry democracy, Wechsler embraced it.  To 
him sentencing authorities should always place “the general 
community” at the center of reform debates for it is the community 
whose “values and security” are often what is most “disturbed” by 
crime.14  Of course, this did not mean that liberal reform should not 
                                                 
8
 See e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, ON THE NORMALITY OF CRIME (1895).  
9
 JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 16 (1940). 
10
 Wechsler, Sentencing, supra note 6 at 473.  
11
 But see, STUART HALL, POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND 
LAW AND ORDER (1978).  
12
 Stuntz, Politics, supra note 7 at 101; Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, supra 
note 7 at 633.  
13
 Stuntz, Politics, supra note 7 at 582, 587, Robinson & Cahill, Degradation, 
supra note 7 at 653. 
14
 Wechsler, Sentencing, supra note 6, at 476. 
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be attempted, only that it should be incorporated, even 
camouflaged, within larger initiatives that accommodated 
retribution.  To show how Wechsler reconciled popular demands 
for retribution with liberal reform, this article will proceed in four 
parts.  Part I will recover Wechsler’s early criminal law thinking, 
showing how he began to develop a sense of the intimate 
relationship between democratic politics and criminal law while a 
young Columbia law professor in the 1930s and a participant in the 
Nuremburg trials in the 1940s.  Part II will discuss Wechsler’s 
application of democratic theory to the Model Penal Code in the 
1950s.  Part III will show how Wechsler applied many of his 
theories to the revision of New York’s Criminal Code in the 1960s.   
Finally, Part IV will examine the manner in Wechsler’s theories 
inform recent developments in criminal law, particularly the 
strange career of the death penalty in New York.  This article 
concludes by suggesting that both current criminal law scholars 
and judges should not only look more carefully at popular views of 
sentencing, but develop a theory of reform that brings democracy 
back in. 
 
 
 
 
 
I. FROM NEW YORK TO NUREMBURG: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 
 
 Born in New York City in 1909, Herbert Wechsler 
confronted criminal law’s direct, sometimes perverse relationship 
to popular politics early on.  Jewish by birth, Wechsler became 
alarmed at the manner in which Protestant nativism led to the 
criminalization of alcohol in 1918.15  Though the Volstead Act 
provided an annual allowance of ten gallons of sacramental wine 
per Jewish family per year, prominent Jewish newspapers like the 
Jewish Daily Forward and the American Hebrew decried the law 
as an infringement on their religious liberty.16  Such complaints 
gained strength when dry leaders accused Jewish rabbis of selling 
sacramental wine out of their homes in New York in 1921.17  
Spurred by anti-semitism, New York’s Bureau of Prohibition 
ultimately refused to issue wine licenses to Jews in the city, 
prompting Wechsler’s family to defy the law “with abandon.”18  
                                                 
15
 MICHAEL A LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 115 
(2007). 
16
 Id. at 120. 
17
 Id.  
18
 Interview by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller with Herbert Wechsler, 
Professor, Columbia University School of Law, in New York City, N.Y. 
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 While his parents broke the law at home, Wechsler came to 
appreciate the obstacles that popular prejudice posed to criminal 
law in other parts of the United States as well.  In 1932, Wechsler 
began a Supreme Court clerkship with Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
that brought him face to face with the vagaries of criminal law in 
the American South.  Only weeks after Wechsler arrived in 
Washington, the Court heard an appeal from the communist-
affiliated International Labor Defense, or ILD, of nine African 
American defendants falsely accused of raping two white women 
in Scottsboro, Alabama.19 The ILD won representation of the 
defendants over the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, or NAACP, and waged a massive political 
campaign to raise awareness for the “Scottsboro boys.”20  
Convinced that litigation alone would fail, the ILD advocated 
“mass action outside of courts and legislative bodies,” staging 
protests, rallies and demonstrations to free the nine black 
defendants.21  From 1931 to 1932, the ILD and its communist 
allies held mass demonstrations in Chicago and New York, staged 
a mass rally in front of the White House, and even sent the mothers 
of the Scottsboro boys on a national tour.22    
 While Alabama’s persecution of the Scottsboro boys 
reinforced Wechsler’s view that popular prejudice undergirded 
criminal law, the ILD’s propaganda campaign awakened him to the 
power of democratic persuasion.  Not only did the ILD hold 
demonstrations, but it churned out reams of propaganda in 
publications like The Daily Worker and New Masses, propaganda 
that, by 1932, bled into more mainstream publications like The 
Nation, the New Republic and the New York Times.23  By the time 
the case reached the Supreme Court in the fall of 1932, figures as 
disparate as Albert Einstein, H.G. Wells, and Maxim Gorky were 
speaking out against the persecution of the nine black defendants.24  
While Alabama juries refused to reconsider the boys’ 
plight, otherwise conservative Justice George Sutherland reversed 
and remanded the convictions of the nine African American 
                                                                                                                                                 
(August 11, 1978; February 23, 1979; March 12 & 13, 1982) [hereinafter 
Wechsler, Interview]. 
19
 HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE, THE DEPRESSION DECADE 146 (1978).  
20
 DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 54-100 
(1969); PATRICIA SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 
NEW DEAL ERA (1996) 87-8; SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18 at 146-7. 
21
 SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18, at 148; CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra 
note 18, at 59, 141-3, 244. 
22
 SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18, at 146; CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra 
note 18, at 146-7, 248-251. 
23
 SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE, supra note 19, at 87-8; SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra 
note 18, at 146-147. 
24
 SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18, at 147.  
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defendants in November 1932, ruling that Alabama had violated 
their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.25  
Though Wechsler returned North in the fall of 1933, he did not 
forget the perverse relationship between popular prejudice and 
criminal law in the South, nor the hope that such law might be 
changed.26  In 1934, Wechsler came out in favor of federal anti-
lynching legislation in the prominent Yale Law Journal.27  
Lynching, a problem that had gradually been in decline in Dixie, 
spiked in 1930 and continued to rise through 1932 and 1933.28  
This violence led to a surge in anti-lynching activism as the 
NAACP pushed for the enactment of a federal anti-lynching bill 
and New Deal liberals like Will Alexander, then employed by the 
Roosevelt administration, formed a commission to study the 
problem.29 
 In a review of two books on lynching sponsored by 
Alexander’s commission, Wechsler argued that “significant 
reconstruction” of the South was necessary and that federal 
legislation was “[f]ar more” likely to achieve reform than solutions 
sponsored by southern states.30  In fact, Wechsler strongly 
advocated federal intervention in southern affairs, noting that 
federal prosecutors “answerable to Washington,” federal judges 
“enjoying life tenure” and federal jurors “drawn from a higher 
economic and social stratum,” promised to be more equitable than 
“the southern legislator.”31   
Of course, Wechsler realized that southern justice might 
look very different if African Americans were allowed to 
participate in the political process.  In the same Yale Law Journal 
piece that he attacked lynching, Wechsler also lamented “the 
political impotence” that black voters suffered under poll taxes, 
literacy tests, and other modes of disfranchisement.32  If such 
obstacles were removed from black access to politics, argued 
                                                 
25
 Id.  
26
 Wechsler recalled Stone’s attitude towards minority rights to be one of 
relative “ambivalence” in the early 1930s, not truly congealing around the idea 
of protecting minority access to the political process until 1938.  This stood in 
marked contrast to the communist intervention on behalf of southern blacks in 
1931. Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 154. 
27
 Wechsler, Review of Lynching and the Law & The Tragedy of Lynching, 44 
YALE L. J. 191, 193 (1934) [hereinafter Wechsler, Review]. 
28
 SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 244-5. 
29
 SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 270-4; SULLIVAN, supra note 19, at 24-5.  
Interestingly, one of the authors of the Costigan-Wagner Anti-lynching bill 
turned out to be Columbia University Law Professor Karl Llewellyn, a colleague 
and former professor of Herbert Wechsler. SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 281. 
30
 Wechsler, Review, supra note 26, at 193. 
31
 Id.  
32
 Wechsler, Review, supra note 26, at 191; State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).  
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Wechsler, then criminal law might be reformed from the ground 
up.33   
Wechsler personally sought to facilitate such reform in 
1934 when ILD lawyer Carol Weiss King asked him for help on a 
Georgia case involving a black communist named Angelo 
Herndon.34  Atlanta police had arrested Herndon in 1932 for 
possessing documents advocating a black-led “revolution” in the 
South; an act that led him to be charged with inciting 
insurrection.35  While Herndon’s charge rested on his possession of 
written material, a relatively innocuous act, authorities were aware 
that he had helped organize a demonstration of the unemployed in 
Atlanta only a month before, thereby evincing an arguably more 
militant commitment to social change.  Also, Herndon had been 
involved in communist organizing in neighboring Alabama for 
several years, and had even worked on the ILD’s campaign to free 
the Scottsboro boys.36   
 Hoping that Herndon’s case might become another 
Scottsboro, the ILD rushed to help Herndon in Georgia.37   
Unfortunately, the group’s trial attorneys encountered an 
unsympathetic jury at the state level, resulting in a sentence of 
eighteen to twenty years on a chain gang for Herndon.38  The 
penalty’s severity prompted Carol Weiss King to approach 
Wechsler through a colleague at Columbia, in the hopes of 
mounting a more robust federal appeal.39   Wechsler agreed and 
ultimately dedicated three years to the case, working on it from 
1934 to 1937.40  The assignment proved formative, an education 
not only in the vagaries of constitutional law but also the 
                                                 
33
 Wechsler, Review supra note 26, at 191.  
34
 Charles Martin maintains that it was Walter Gellhorn, one of Wechsler’s 
colleagues, who approached him about representing Herndon.  CHARLES H. 
MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JUSTICE 140 (1963).  
This contradicts Wechsler’s memory of events, which was that Carol Weiss 
King contacted him, Gellhorn and Jerome Michael at roughly the same time 
about aiding Herndon’s case.  Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 125. 
35
 SITKOFF, NEW DEAL, supra note 18, at 150. 
36
 MARTIN, HERNDON, supra note 33, at 10.  
37
 Id. at 12-14. See also, Joseph North, Angelo Herndon, Fighter, NEW MASSES 
11, 12 (Aug. 21, 1934).  
38
 MARTIN, HERNDON, supra note 33, at 61; North, Fighter, supra note 36, at 11.  
39
 Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 125. 
40
 According to some accounts, Carol Weiss King approached Gellhorn, who 
then approached Wechsler.  According to others, King approached Wechsler, 
Gellhorn and Jerome Michael, who later bowed out due to his southern ties.  
Wechsler’s account is that King contacted him and Gellhorn simultaneously, 
and that he and Gellhorn contacted Whitney North Seymour.  Wechsler 
Interview, supra note 17, at 126.  Charles Martin suggests a slightly different 
version of events, based on Seymour’s memory, which is that he enlisted 
Wechsler and Gellhorn to aid in him in preparing the briefs.  MARTIN, 
HERNDON, supra note 33, at 140-2.  
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intersection between criminal law and popular politics.  Though 
only one of what would eventually become six lawyers on 
Herndon’s team, Wechsler later confessed to having written “the 
briefs in both cases,” documents that sought to undermine 
Georgia’s criminal insurrection law as an unconstitutional exercise 
of state power over free speech.41   
 Despite his best efforts, Wechsler’s first brief failed.42  
Though the young law professor went to great lengths to show that 
Herndon had not posed a clear and present danger to the state of 
Georgia, the Supreme Court dismissed his complaint on the 
grounds that Herndon’s lawyer had not raised the issue 
successfully at trial.43  Undaunted, Wechsler began searching for 
an alternate theory upon which to continue Herndon’s case while 
the ILD engaged in an impressive display of popular politics, or 
what it called “mass pressure” to stoke popular support for 
Herndon’s defense.44  In the summer of 1935, the ILD arranged for 
Herndon to tour the west coast, even building a cage like the ones 
used to house prisoners on Georgia chain gangs to accompany 
him.45  In October of that year, the ILD held a mass demonstration 
in New York during which Herndon himself argued that the 
Supreme Court had denied his appeal not on legal deficiencies but 
in order to keep “white and Negro workers from organizing” in the 
                                                 
41
 During his interviews with Silber and Miller, Wechsler recalled writing the 
“bulk” of Herndon’s legal briefs himself.  Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 
125-7.  During his testimony before the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 1944, however, he confessed to having researched and written 
“the briefs in both cases.”  Statement of Herbert Wechsler, “Nomination of 
Herbert Wechsler,of New York, to be Assistant Attorney General,” U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, May 29, 1944, 75, 78.  
Atlanta attorneys Elbert Tuttle and William A. Sutherland also participated in 
the case, though Wechsler remembered them to be involved primarily in 
Herndon’s second appeal.  Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 
U.S. 441 (1935) (No.  665). 
42
 Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935). 
43
 Brief for the Appellant, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (No.  665). 
44
 Interestingly, the rise of fascism abroad seemed to help activists like Herndon 
at home as well.  In April 1936, for example, not long after Hitler mobilized 
German troops in the Rhineland, anti-war protests broke out on college and high 
school campuses across the United States. Nation’s Students Join Peace Rallies, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1936, at 14.  Though unrelated to race, the protests did 
have implications for free speech as students promised not to strike at those 
institutions allowing them to “express their views without censorship” many 
taking “Oxford” oaths not to fight in future wars.  Id.  Angelo Herndon, in a 
testament to his growing notoriety, spoke at one such rally held by Yale 
University. Id.   Herndon also addressed a crowd of over 20,000 people at 
Madison Square Garden in New York City in November 1936, denouncing 
racism in the South and fascism abroad. Fascism is Issue, Browder Contends, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1936, at 18.  See GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING 
DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 67-105, 112-154 (2008). 
45
 MARTIN, HERNDON, supra note 33, at 154.  
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Deep South.46  Herndon’s fusion of the black struggle in the South 
with the struggle of labor generally cast his own case in a more 
broad-based light, one that implicated the Supreme Court’s initial 
decision against him as part of a larger move to suppress labor and 
the New Deal.47   
 Though it is impossible to know whether the ILD’s tactics 
had an effect on the nation’s highest tribunal, the Supreme Court 
did agree to rehear Herndon’s case in April 1937.48  The reason for 
the rehearing was a Georgia law unearthed by Wechsler that 
provided an appeal in cases where a statute’s constitutionality had 
not been raised appropriately at the state level.49  This resolved the 
technical deficiency in Herndon’s initial petition, namely that he 
had failed to raise a constitutional objection to Georgia’s 
insurrection statute at the trial level.50  However, the question of 
whether such an objection should, or for that matter even could 
have been raised was debatable. The trial judge had actually agreed 
with Herndon’s attorneys on the constitutional interpretation of the 
statute in question, namely that it only imposed liability when the 
accused represented an imminent danger to the state.51  It was a 
surprise to Herndon then when the Georgia Supreme Court 
reinterpreted the statute against him, holding that it not only 
punished offenders for risking imminent overthrow of the 
government, but overthrow of the state at “any time,” thereby 
raising a constitutional question that Herndon had not 
anticipated.52  In a manner that reflected bias against Herndon, the 
United States Supreme Court held that Herndon should have 
predicted the Georgia Supreme Court was going to reinterpret the 
statute against him based on two of its past opinions, neither of 
which dealt with similar facts.53  To Wechsler’s mind, this holding 
was suspect, indicating possible bias on the Court.  Convinced that 
Herndon should be free, he decided to go back through Georgia’s 
statutes to find grounds for a second appeal, ultimately discovering 
a habeas petition keeping federal challenges to state statutes open, 
                                                 
46
 Herndon Cheered as Martyr by 2,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1935, at 15. 
47
 Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Mass Politics in the Making of the Civil Rights 
Lawyer, 1931-1941, 93 J. OF AMERICAN HIST. 44-6 (2006); SITKOFF, NEW 
DEAL, supra note 18, at 148-9.  
48
 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).  For a discussion of Lowry’s 
significance, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 
375 (1997); and HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH IN AMERICA 169-175 (1988). 
49
 Wechsler, Interview, supra note 17, at 75.  
50
 Georgia, 295 U.S. at 448-9. 
51
 Justice Cardozo found the Court’s refusal to hear Herndon’s case to be a 
procedural dodge.  See, Cardozo, dissenting, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 
at 447-449.  
52
 Georgia, 295 U.S. at 445-6. .  
53
 Georgia, 295 U.S. at 444. 
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even when the statute’s constitutionality had not been raised at 
trial.   
 After three years of pressure from the ILD, the Court 
agreed to rehear Herndon’s case.  And, in 1937, he won.54  
Communists rejoiced.55  “Herndon is Free!” proclaimed the 
communist paper The New Masses, praising the “mass pressure” 
that the ILD had applied on his behalf.56  “[H]ow come this change 
in attitude of the court?” asked New Masses writer Joseph North.57  
“The answer,” North continued, was not in Wechsler’s skill as an 
attorney, but in the “tidal wave of labor organization,” the “surge 
of sit-down strikes,” and the “growing unity of labor” nationwide 
all of which “inevitably caused the Court to reconsider its previous 
decision.”58   
 While it is unlikely that communist “mass pressure” alone 
influenced the Supreme Court, changing winds caused by the Great 
Depression probably did help Herndon’s case.  In 1937, President 
Roosevelt threatened to increase the number of justices on the 
Supreme Court by appointing judges sympathetic to the New Deal, 
a plan that the President announced on the same day that 
Herndon’s second appeal went up for oral argument.59  FDR’s 
court-packing plan coincided with a dramatic spike in the power of 
labor unions and “labor’s rights” following the presidential 
election of 1936.60  Wechsler capitalized on this surge by de-
emphasizing Herndon’s racial identity in his second brief, 
meanwhile stressing his labor credentials.61  He lifted a discussion 
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of the demonstration that Herndon had organized in Atlanta out of 
the footnotes and into the main text, making sure to note that 
Herndon had been demonstrating not just for blacks but for 
“unemployment relief” and “unemployment insurance” for all 
workers.62  Further, Wechsler made sure to argue that while some 
of Herndon’s literature advocated the creation of a black state, a 
terrifying proposition to southern whites, the sum of Herndon’s 
material merely endorsed the “peaceful organization of the 
unemployed.”63 
 Despite the lawyering skills that he brought to the case, 
Wechsler left Herndon agreeing with the ILD that the “winds” of 
politics had decided the ultimate outcome.64  This reaffirmed his 
belief that politics, not principal undergirded criminal law, and that 
popular opinion could dramatically alter the kinds of sentences that 
defendants received.  As popular opinion shifted in favor of labor 
and labor’s rights, the Court found new reason to review 
Herndon’s case, ultimately releasing him from a Georgia chain 
gang.   
Similar types of nullification, believed Wechsler, emerged 
in other contexts as well, particularly cases involving the death 
penalty.  In a 1937 article co-written with Columbia Law professor 
and colleague Jerome Michael, Wechsler argued that “there is a 
point” at which “severe penalties” like death might actually stir “a 
sympathy for those accused of crime,” leading to “nullification” of 
the law by jurors, witnesses, and prosecutors.65  This view, which 
Wechsler invoked as part of a larger argument about the need to 
lower the severity of punishment to fit individual crimes, reflected 
a sensitivity to the democratic politics of criminal law, particularly 
the manner in which both jurors and prosecutors could manipulate 
sentencing outcomes to coincide with popular sentiment.  Indeed, 
it suggests that Wechsler understood criminal law to be a relatively 
fragile legal edifice subject to “nullification” by actors who were 
neither judges nor legislators, but still had the power to influence 
sentencing. 
How might non-judicial/non-legislative actors control, or 
“nullify” sentencing?  Prosecutors could simply decide not to 
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prosecute cases, even if there was sufficient evidence to proceed.  
Witnesses, meanwhile, could refuse to testify while jurors, long 
celebrated for their nullification power, could simply refuse to 
convict.  Though Wechsler did not provide specific examples of 
the above happening in the United States in the 1930s, he probably 
did not have to.  The nation had only recently given up its attempt 
to criminalize alcohol consumption, a fiasco that had led to 
rampant lawbreaking nationwide.66  Popular rejection of 
Prohibition was so bad in fact that it had led to a dramatic rise in 
organized crime and state sponsored corruption, a phenomenon 
that spurred governmental investigations into both criminal 
organization and police in the 1930s.67  As the government focused 
its attention on stopping crime, the public developed a bizarre 
affinity for “celebrity bandits,” men like Alphonse Capone and 
John Dillinger who flaunted criminal law.68  To a law professor 
writing in 1937, four years after Prohibition had been repealed, the 
idea that popular sympathy for criminals might nullify criminal 
law was not strange.  In fact, popular sympathy for criminals had 
led President Roosevelt to campaign successfully for re-amending 
the Constitution and restoring legality to alcohol.  
Another factor that might have contributed to Wechsler’s 
fear that the public might reduce punishments and nullify the law 
was the persistence of the Great Depression.  By 1937, the United 
States had entered its seventh year of an economic crisis marked 
by unprecedented unemployment, poverty, and popular distress.69  
That such dire straits might have increased popular sympathy for 
criminal defendants, or at least tempered popular demand for harsh 
punishment, is probably reasonable to assume.  Indeed, in 1936 
divisions between law-breaking and morality became blurred as 
autoworkers in Flint, Michigan seized control of a massive General 
Motors plant, winning enthusiastic endorsement from proponents 
of labor across the United States, even though GM branded the 
strikers as criminals.70    
Interestingly, even as Wechsler feared that harsh 
punishment might lead to nullification by a downtrodden public, he 
also became concerned that an overly liberal application of the 
death penalty might harm public morals.  “It is at least arguable,” 
noted Wechsler in 1937, that the “use of the death penalty” may 
actually “brutalize” the “non-criminal population” meanwhile 
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providing examples of “the very kinds of behavior” that the 
punishment is designed to deter.71  To provide support for this 
theory, Wechsler cited the execution of Ruth Snyder, a New York 
woman convicted of murdering her husband just prior to the stock 
market crash in 1929, with the help of a paramour named Henry 
Judd Gray.  Partly due to the dramatic nature of the crime, 
committed with blunt sash weights, newspapers focused on the 
case for months, eventually describing Mrs. Snyder’s death in 
meticulous detail.  For example, the New York Times noted that 
Snyder entered the “death chamber” with her “face tearful and eyes 
aghast,” only to start begging for mercy once a “black leather 
mask” was placed over her face.72 
Wechsler’s fear that such macabre attention to detail might 
“brutalize” the population reflected a rationale for opposing the 
death penalty that initially seemed different from the fear that the 
public might nullify the law by allowing killers to go free.  Among 
other things, it reflected a paternalist concern for the public’s 
mental well-being, a position that assumed voters were relatively 
impressionable when it came to the gory details of death.  At first 
glance, this seemed to contradict Wechsler’s fear that the public 
were themselves a threat to the legal system precisely because they 
were able to nullify the law in cases where they believed that the 
defendant, even if guilty, should not be killed.  Pulling the camera 
back for a moment, if the public sympathized with offenders 
enough to nullify the law, how could the law then be in a position 
to “brutalize” them?   
Wechsler’s seemingly contradictory positions on the death 
penalty maintained at least one common thread.  In both cases of 
nullification and brutalization, the intersections between popular 
opinion and law were critical to assessing the success or failure of 
formal legal process; in this case the administration of the death 
penalty.  Before states should legalize execution, for example, 
Wechsler argued that they should try to gauge “popular sentiment” 
even in cases where it was “rarely uniform.”73  What the state 
should not do, he warned, was ignore popular sentiment and 
consign the “question of punishment” to “the discretion” of 
“administrators.”74  Administrators worried Wechsler because they 
could easily thwart the “development and articulation of uniform 
policies” that coincided with popular rule, and therefore possessed 
a better chance of not being overturned by future legislation.75 
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In short, Wechsler supported a democratically responsive 
criminal law, one that sought to keep abreast of popular opinion 
without letting popular consensus neutralize basic criminal law 
goals like making sure that the severity of punishment fit the 
severity of crime.  In 1937, this democratic concern seemed to lead 
Wechsler to come out relatively strongly against the death penalty, 
both as a brutalizing force and an invitation to popular nullification 
of the law.   
Yet, Wechsler also saw a utilitarian reason for keeping 
death alive.  In 1940, Wechsler and his colleague Jerome Michael 
authored a criminal law casebook that mentioned, in passing, a 
rationale for execution.  “[T]he desire for revenge,” wrote 
Wechsler and Michael, “the belief that retributive punishment is 
just, and the feeling that examples must be made of those guilty of 
shocking crimes are to a very considerable degree entrenched in 
the general population.”76  Recognizing that the public may want 
severe punishments in certain cases, Wechsler and Michael 
advanced a utilitarian rationale for harsh punishment, even death. 
“Too lenient treatment of offenders,” they argued, “however well 
adapted to reforming them, may therefore lead to lynching, self-
help or indifference about prosecution which may be far worse in 
their social consequences than the utilization of more severe 
methods of treatment which satisfy the popular desire for severity 
though they have no reformative capacity.”77  That light 
punishment might lead to “lynching, self-help, or indifference 
about prosecution,” was a remarkable claim.  Not only did it 
suggest that harsh punishment should be used to satisfy popular 
outrage, but it seemed to contradict Wechsler’s own position on 
lynching in the South.  How, for example, could southern lynching 
possibly be a result of too lenient punishment of black offenders?  
Wasn’t the problem that southern whites rejected any semblance of 
legal process when it came to blacks? And why why invoke federal 
power to stop lynching, if all that was needed was harsher 
punishment? 
 Neither Wechsler nor Michael were strangers to the kind of 
popular justice that stalked southern states.  Michael, who was also 
Jewish, had grown up in the South.  Born in Athens, Georgia in 
1890, Michael was twenty-five years old when Georgia authorities 
prosecuted and sentenced a Jewish pencil-factory manager who 
worked outside Atlanta named Leo Frank.  Accused of murdering 
a thirteen-year old girl, Frank was found guilty by a Georgia trial 
jury but questions about the evidence in the case prompted Georgia 
Governor John M. Slaton to commute his sentence from death to 
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life in prison.  Outraged, a mob of private citizens, some prominent 
Georgians, stormed the state prison farm where Frank was held, 
kidnapped him, and brutally lynched him near Marietta, garnering 
headlines.78   
Is it possible that Michael and Wechsler, both Jews, 
believed Frank’s sentence should never have been commuted?  
Probably not, but their encounters with the South left an indelible 
imprint nevertheless.  Unlike reformers who focused exclusively 
on offenders, neither Michael nor Wechsler would ever forget the 
active, even catastrophic role that the public could play in altering 
criminal outcomes, amending criminal sentences, or even 
“nullifying” criminal law.  Further, these lessons applied across the 
United States, not just the Deep South.  In San Jose, California in 
1933, for example, angry citizens seized and lynched John Holmes 
and Thomas H. Thurmond, both white, after they confessed to 
kidnapping and murdering a young boy named Brooke Hart.79  The 
lynching became so popular that California Governor James 
Rolph, Jr. commended the mob’s leaders for being “patriotic 
citizens.”80 
Popular support for the death penalty molded Wechsler’s 
thinking on the utility of retribution, inspiring him to assert not 
only that soft punishment might lead to lynching, but that it could 
also result in “self-help” and “indifference about prosecution.”  
While lynching and self-help referred to the removal of the 
criminal process by private individuals from the state, Wechsler’s 
reference to “indifference about prosecution” was less clear.  Did 
this mean that if punishment was not severe enough then the public 
might simply lose interest in the criminal process?  If so, why was 
this not a good thing?  Had not Wechsler been disturbed by 
popular fascination with the trial and execution of Ruth Snyder?  
Or, had Wechsler come to realize that popular indifference to the 
criminal process was a bad thing, a phenomenon that might 
facilitate handing the reigns over to agents free from public 
control, perhaps even some kind of “administrator”?   
Wechsler’s mention of popular indifference to the criminal 
process as a bad thing suggested that popular interest in the 
criminal process was actually a good thing.  In fact, his warning 
that popular indifference could lead to “social consequences” far 
worse than the harsh punishment of a small number of offenders 
hinted at a positive correlation between the criminal process and 
popular interest.  Here, Wechsler’s utilitarian view of punishment 
as a means of keeping the people vested in the legal system 
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coincided with his earlier interest in the intersection between 
criminal law and popular opinion, opinion that could either be 
brutalized by the law or, conversely, nullify it.     
 Perhaps the single-biggest event that convinced Wechsler 
of the uses of retribution occurred five years after he and Jerome 
Michael completed their casebook. Following the Allied victory 
over Hitler in World War II, former Attorney General Francis 
Biddle asked Wechsler whether he wanted to serve as an aide in 
the prosecution of Nazi high officials in Nuremburg, Germany.81  
Wechsler agreed and for almost a year beginning October 1945 
watched as American, Russian, British, and French prosecutors 
excoriated Nazis in court.82  Two lessons stayed with him.  One 
was that retribution, not deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation 
justified trying the Nazis.83  Two, the retribution directed at 
Hitler’s lieutenants had a distinctly utilitarian purpose.  As 
Wechsler later remembered it, popular “demand for retribution” 
against the Nazis was so great that it “rose like a plaintive chant” 
from Europe’s “desolated lands” following the war.84  In fact, 
retribution, or the prevention of private citizens from exacting 
retribution, became, for Wechsler, the most compelling reason for 
holding the trials.  “[W]ho can doubt,” he wrote, “that 
indiscriminate violence,” indeed “a blood bath beyond power of 
control” would have exploded in Europe had the Allies announced 
that “no trial would take place?”85  The reason for trying Nazi 
officials was not simply to punish them, but rather to provide some 
“institutional mechanism” that would “reserve the application of 
violence” to public entities and not private actors.86  The 
prevention of private recriminations, concluded Wechsler, was the 
most “constructive purpose” behind the war crimes tribunal.87 
 If Prohibition convinced Wechsler that politically 
unpopular criminal laws would be broken “with abandon,” 
Nuremburg persuaded him that retribution had utilitarian value.  
Though there was nothing that could be done to German high 
officials that would be commensurate with the harms that they had 
caused, at least a formal trial promised to convince private citizens 
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that they need not take matters into their own hands.  This meant 
that satisfying the retributive desires of average people was by 
itself an important goal of the criminal process, regardless of the 
utilitarian effect that punishment had on the offender.   
 Nuremberg formed the third leg in Wechsler’s triadic 
vision of retributive utilitarianism.  It reminded him that public 
desires for retribution needed to be satisfied lest private violence 
ensue and therefore complemented the lesson of Prohibition, which 
was that public prejudice ultimately determined the contours of 
criminal law.  However, Wechsler never became a fatalist.  Angelo 
Herndon’s journey through the American court system convinced 
him that even though popular prejudice determined the contours of 
the law, that prejudice could be mitigated, even reversed through 
political propaganda, agitation, and education.  Prior to 
Roosevelt’s 1936 election, the rise of “labor’s rights,” and the 
Court-packing plan, Herndon had little chance of gaining an 
acquittal.  Following these events, however, Herndon’s fortunes 
changed dramatically.  Whether the ILD’s political organizing had 
anything to do with this or not, Wechsler became so impressed 
with the organization’s approach to practicing law “outside of 
courts and legislative bodies,” that he ultimately became a member 
of the group’s legal advisory board.88  
 In the next section, we shall see how Wechsler’s personal 
experiences informed his reform efforts, particularly his 
commentaries on the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code.  
Partly due to his work with Michael in the 1930s, ALI chose him 
to serve as Chief Reporter on the Model Penal Code project.  It 
would prove to be a hands-on opportunity for him to apply his 
political sensibilities to the reform of criminal law.  
   
  
 
II. POPULAR CONSENSUS AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
 
First envisioned as a corrective to the common law in the 
1930s, the Model Penal Code project finally gained sufficient 
funding to proceed in the 1950s.  Animating the Code was a sense 
that criminal law had failed to stay abreast of modern 
developments in psychology and the social sciences, becoming 
over-burdened with idiosyncratic offenses lacking logical 
definition.  To correct this, the Code’s drafters devised a series of 
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innovations that states could adopt as they pleased, depending on 
how far they wanted to go down the road to reform.89  
Assembled over a ten year period, the MPC abolished 
common law notions of malice and reduced mental state to four 
simple categories: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and 
negligence.  The MPC also simplified a variety of common law 
crimes.  Instead of battery, aggravated assault, and mayhem, for 
example, the MPC simply prohibited “bodily injury.”90  Rather 
than particularized offenses aimed at punishing recklessness like 
“failure to protect [the] public from attack by wild animals and 
reptiles,” “throwing knives or shooting at human being in course of 
exhibition,” and “negligently furnishing insecure scaffolding,” the 
Code simply included a statute prohibiting “reckless conduct.”91 
Perhaps the Code’s most controversial innovation was a 
focus on the treatment of offenders, rather than simply their 
punishment.  According to Wechsler, who outlined the basic 
“challenge” of a Model Penal Code in 1952, the primary goal of 
criminal law was to reduce crime by successfully treating present 
and future offenders.  “Treatment,” according to Wechsler, 
included both rehabilitation and reform of present offenders, 
through for example probation and parole, as well as deterrence.  
“[T]he deterrence of potential offenders is a practicable objective 
of their treatment” posited Wechsler.92   
The MPC’s focus on treatment rankled some criminal law 
scholars, most notably Henry M. Hart, who maintained that the 
Code should balance its emphasis on offenders with a counter-
emphasis on “the aims of the good society generally.”93  Noting 
that crime was different from other wrongs, or torts, because it 
incurred “the moral condemnation of the community,” Hart argued 
that substituting notions of treatment for notions of punishment 
confused criminal law with the practice of medicine, doing a 
“disservice” to the “purposes of law as a whole.”94  “The core of 
the difference” between criminal law and medicine, observed Hart, 
“is that the patient has not incurred the moral condemnation of his 
community, whereas the convict has.”95 
Hart’s complaints that the MPC substituted treatmentism 
for the “conscience of the community” obscured the fact that the 
Code’s Reporters actually did keep the relationship between 
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criminal law and public opinion at the forefront of their minds.  
This was particularly true for offenses that stirred popular outrage 
but were otherwise victimless, like incest.  Positing that 
prohibitions against incest “may have their justification” in the 
“science of genetics,” Wechsler noted that upon close scrutiny 
there was actually scant scientific evidence supporting 
continuation of the crime.96  Conceding that many opposed incest 
on the grounds that it encouraged “defective offspring,” Wechsler 
observed that the offense could not be explained by “breeding 
objectives” alone because it was not “limited to child-bearing” but 
applied to couples who decided not to have children.97   Breeding-
objectives also failed to explain why marriages were forbidden 
“between persons not related by blood,” like “step children,” 
“adoptive” relatives, and “daughter[s]-in-law.”98 
Even data on whether parents who were related risked a 
higher degree of genetic defects, argued Wechsler, was 
inconclusive.  Although “consanguineous marriages” may 
“increase the incidence of defective offspring” in the first 
generation, he noted, this was only true if both parents carried a 
“rare, recessive, unfavorable gene,” not common among the 
general population.99  The probability of such a misfortune, 
continued Wechsler, was “not significantly increased by 
consanguineous mating” so long as the “unfavorable gene [was] 
common in the population.”100  In fact, unfavorable genes would 
negatively impact individuals whether incest was criminalized or 
not.  “[A]ny decrease in the number of first generation defectives,” 
argued Wechsler, would be “balanced by an increase in later 
generations,” as the negative genes of individual parents entered 
the general population, raising the “frequency with which the 
marriage of unrelated persons produces the unfavorable 
characteristic.”101  In fact, “animal inbreeding” indicated that 
“permanent favorable effects” could be achieved by “continuous 
control of matings through successive generations” with an eye to 
“elimination of unfavorable lines.”102 
Recognizing that most voters would be reluctant to apply 
theories of animal breeding to people, Wechsler concluded that the 
crime of incest should be retained lest popular opposition erupt.  
“Even if it were demonstrable,” wrote Wechsler, that incest laws 
“promote no secular goal,” doing away with the offense would be a 
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mistake given the public’s “intense hostility” to the crime.103  At 
least some of this hostility derived from religious sources.  “The 
bible defines and prohibits incest,” noted Wechsler, so much so 
that “modern legislation” forbidding incest “is largely derived from 
canon law.”104 “The religious character of the prohibition,” he 
continued, was most obvious in states like Rhode Island, where 
Jews were exempted from prohibitions against “uncle-niece” and 
“aunt-nephew” marriages “since such marriages are permissible 
for that religious group.”105  Here Wechsler, himself of Jewish 
descent, evinced an awareness of community norms as a guiding 
factor in criminal law.  To further establish the importance of 
keeping local norms in mind, Wechsler articulated a general 
principle of criminal lawmaking: “a penal law will neither be 
accepted nor respected,” declared Wechsler, “if it does not seek to 
repress that which is universally regarded by the community as 
misbehavior.”106  No matter how irrational a particular offense may 
be, in other words, community support for that offense justified its 
survival. 
Of course, if community attitudes appeared to be shifting 
then reform was probably in order, as in the case of adultery and 
fornication.  Noting that prosecution for adultery and fornication 
served several utilitarian objectives, including “preservation of the 
institution of marriage,” “prevention of illegitimacy,” and 
“prevention of disease,” Wechsler still lobbied for dissolution of 
the offenses on the grounds that they lacked popular support.107  
Citing two reports by University of Indiana professor Alfred 
Kinsey, Wechsler noted that “a large proportion of the population 
is guilty at one time or another” of adultery, while pre-marital 
intercourse was “very common and widely tolerated.”108  To 
further establish popular opposition to the offenses of fornication 
and adultery, Wechsler noted that “complaints are almost always 
withdrawn,” and sentences imposed “only in exceptional 
circumstances.”109 
Why be concerned with offenses that were widely broken 
but rarely prosecuted?  To Wechsler’s mind, the criminalization of 
conduct that most people thought was acceptable threatened the 
very legitimacy of the law. “Impossibility of enforcement” he 
warned in the MPC Commentaries, tends “to bring the law into 
disrepute.”110  Here, Wechsler flagged another reason for paying 
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attention to popular opinion, one that went far beyond the 
utilitarian goals of preserving or abolishing any single offense.  
The legitimacy of the entire legal system, he implied, could suffer 
if lawmakers did not reconcile criminal law with popular 
consensus.  “Criminal law,” argued Wechsler, could not 
“undertake or pretend to draw the line where religion or morals 
would draw it.”111 Repeating his emphasis on the danger of 
unenforceable crimes, “criminal liabilities,” that proved 
“unenforceable because of nullification” argued Wechsler, should 
be “eliminated.”112 
While the desirability of elimination was easy to determine 
for certain offenses, it was not for others.  Abortion posed a 
particularly complex problem.  At the time, an “absolute 
prohibition” existed on abortion in the United States, with only 
half a dozen states recognizing an exception “for the purpose of 
saving the mother’s life.”113  Yet, illegal abortions persisted, 
leading to over 300,000 abortions per year and the death of roughly 
8,000 women annually.114  Though “ethical or religious” objections 
constituted a significant obstacle to liberalization, Wechsler 
suspected that “the weight of critical and public opinion” favored a 
“more restricted application of criminal sanctions” than what was 
then in place.115  This led the Reporter to recommend “a policy of 
cautious expansion of the categories of lawful justification” of 
abortion.116  
Wechsler endorsed three instances where abortion should 
be legal.  The first included cases where the mother’s life was at 
risk, an exception already recognized in some states.117  The 
second included cases where abortion was necessary to “prevent 
gravely defective offspring” including cases where infants were 
likely to have “serious abnormalities” including “gravely defective 
central nervous systems.”118  The third case for available abortions, 
argued Wechsler, should be cases of pregnancy resulting from 
rape.119  Popular support for rape-victims, argued Wechsler, was 
relatively high.  Evidence of this emerged in 1956, when a woman 
from Philadelphia was denied permission to abort a rape-induced 
pregnancy.  The woman’s plight was “sympathetically reported in 
the press” as an example of “an unrealistic legal requirement.”120   
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Pregnancies resulting from statutory rape garnered a 
different response.  Noting that “some foreign laws” allow 
abortions in cases of statutory rape, Wechsler worried that 
exempting young consenters might “be misinterpreted as 
affirmative approval” of a “practice strongly discountenanced by 
substantial groups in society.”121  For this reason, the “issue was 
left among those,” upon which the MPC took “no position.”122   
Concerns that popular opinion should guide, if not 
determine criminal lawmaking applied not only to abortion but to 
the death penalty as well.  Noting that “[o]n balance, the Reporter 
favors abolition” of the penalty, Wechsler counseled that it would 
be useless for the Institute to recommend ending capital 
punishment given that “many jurisdictions will retain [the] 
sentence of death” regardless of what the ALI recommended.123  
Even states that decided to abolish the penalty, continued 
Wechsler, could expect adverse results.  Indeed “some 
communities” might even find that doing away with the death 
penalty invited the “greater evil” of “private violence.”124  Here 
Wechsler picked up on a point that he had made over twenty years 
earlier, namely that private citizens might be tempted to take the 
law into their own hands if certain penalties were not retained.   
University of Pennsylvania professor and special consultant 
to the MPC project Thorsten Sellin disagreed. In a special report 
conducted exclusively for the MPC staff, Sellin argued that “no 
good basis” existed for claiming that retaining the death penalty 
would “prevent an outraged community from taking the law into 
its own hands.”125  Though lynchings had declined dramatically 
over the course of the twentieth century, Sellin argued, southern 
states that led “in the total number of persons lynched” also tended 
to be “among the leaders in the use of capital executions.”126  
Conversely, states like Arizona, Colorado, and Missouri, all of 
which had “experimented” with abolition of the death penalty, 
suffered no surge in lynchings once the penalty was removed.127 
Rather than reduce private violence, Sellin argued that 
retaining the death penalty might actually increase it.  Citing 
several historical examples, Sellin noted that “the desire to be 
executed” had actually caused people to kill in the Eighteenth 
Century.  In 1760, a lieutenant in the Pennsylvania militia became 
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“weary of life,” and shot an innocent man in the street “in order to 
deprive himself of existence” through state sponsored execution.128  
Five years later, two Philadelphians committed murder in the 
hopes that their own lives might be taken by the state.  The first, 
Henrich Albers “cut the throat of a twelve-year old German boy,” 
so that he “might lose his own life,” while the second, “cut the 
throat of his own three-months old son” so that he might “die by 
the process of law.”129  Why murder others rather than simply 
commit suicide?  One reason was religion.  “[B]y murdering 
another person and thereby being sentenced to death,” explained 
Sellin, one could repent for one’s crime prior to being executed 
and thereby “still attain salvation.”130  Individuals who committed 
suicide, on the other hand, remained guilty of a “sin more serious 
than fornication” and would automatically be denied entry to 
Heaven.131 
Despite a lack of evidence that the death penalty reduced 
private violence and in certain bizarre cases even contributed to it, 
Thellin cautioned the ALI to think seriously before it abandoned 
execution.   Proponents of the penalty were less interested in 
statistics, he conceded, than “tradition and what we have earlier 
called dogmas” rooted in the “feelings of the people.”132  These 
feelings, recognized Sellin, could be “deeply rooted in a people’s 
culture,” and hard to dispel.133  Only when popular opinion 
becomes “so oriented” that the majority of voters “favor the 
abolition of the death penalty” would political support for it truly 
disappear.134  
Precisely because popular support for the death penalty 
remained high, the MPC’s drafters retained the penalty.  However, 
they did become interested in the question of who precisely should 
determine death.  Aware that both judges and juries could decide, 
Wechsler argued that there were “strong arguments” in favor of 
allowing judges to determine death.135  To his mind, they were 
likely to be “less emotional or prejudiced” than juries, judicial 
tenures were more likely to promote “equality” in results, and 
judicial decisions were more likely to be based on “responsibility 
and rationality” because courts “might be persuaded to give 
reasons for determinations.”136 
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Yet, Wechsler concluded that it would be “unwise” to make 
any “changes” in the “prevailing practice” of leaving the 
determination of death to the jury.137  This was because “many 
legislators would resist” abandoning the position that “the decision 
of life and death ought to reflect community, not specialized 
judgment.”138  Legislative “objection,” continued Wechsler, 
“should not be invited” unless reformers possessed a “strong 
conviction” that whatever change in the law was being proposed 
amounted to a “great improvement” likely to curry popular 
support.139  When it came to the question of removing the power to 
decide death from juries, concluded Wechsler, “[t]he Reporter does 
not hold such a conviction.”140 
Precisely because of Wechsler’s concern for community 
sentiment, the Model Penal Code retained the death penalty and 
the jury’s power to determine it.  The Code also retained the 
crimes of incest and abortion, though exceptions to abortion were 
proposed in cases of rape, health of the mother, and genetic 
defects.  Fornication and adultery, by contrast, were completely 
eliminated.  Recognizing that the ALI made political concessions 
in drafting the MPC helps to capture the manner in which liberal 
reformers at mid-century understood Henry Hart’s basic argument 
that criminal law should reflect the conscience, and condemnation, 
of the community.  Though celebrated for emphasizing treatment, 
the Code also respected community norms, even those that had no 
value to offenders.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the completion of the 
MPC gained headlines, most of them favorable.141  
While the MPC Commentaries remain one of the best 
windows into Wechsler’s thinking on the relationship between 
criminal law and popular demands for retribution in the 1950s, he 
continued to sharpen his ideas in the 1960s.  Just as the Code was 
completed, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed 
Wechsler to a commission to revise New York’s criminal law.  
Records of Wechsler’s work on that Commission are perhaps the 
best example of his sense that retribution had utilitarian value.   
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III. REFORMING NEW YORK’S PENAL LAW 
 
Inspired by the ALI’s work, Republican Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller appointed Wechsler to a Temporary Commission to 
Revise New York’s Penal Law on June 21, 1961, hoping that he 
could bring his legal expertise to benefit the Empire State.142  The 
1961 commission was, in many ways, a product of Rockefeller’s 
moderate Republican politics, if not his presidential aspirations.  
“The Penal Law and Criminal code contain archaic provisions 
which should be modernized,” asserted Rockefeller in 1961, “The 
volume of provisions can be greatly reduced and the procedures 
can be simplified without affecting substantial rights.”143   
One of Rockefeller’s goals was to make good on a 
campaign promise to reduce crime.  Though moderate, Rockefeller 
had won the governorship partly due to public frustration with 
Democrat Averill Harriman’s failure to control crime in New 
York.144  In 1958, Republican Representative Kenneth B. Keating 
accused Harriman of “lax and laggardly anti-crime efforts” even 
implying that Democrats were reluctant to crack-down on crime 
for fear that it might expose a “tie-up between criminal elements 
and political leaders.”145  Such accusations were bolstered by the 
shocking discovery of a mafia convention in Appalachin, New 
York in November 1957, a meeting of criminal kingpins that 
Democratic leaders purportedly knew about but failed to disrupt.146  
Dismay at this discovery led to Republican-led investigations of 
organized crime in the state, investigations that echoed national 
Senate inquiries into organized crime by Tennessee Democrat 
Estes Kefauver.147  Fearing Kefauver might beat him to the White 
House, Nelson Rockefeller made fighting crime a central part of 
his political platform in New York.148  
In April 1959, Rockefeller promised to reduce a backlog of 
criminal cases in New York City, even urging passage of a 
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constitutional amendment permitting defendants to waive 
indictment, moving them more quickly to either plea-bargaining or 
trial.149  At the same time, Rockefeller endorsed more liberal 
reforms like simplifying New York’s Criminal Code and 
regulating police.  Not long after becoming governor, he signed an 
anti-crime bill into law that created an eight-member Municipal 
Police Training Council assigned to “draw up minimum training 
requirements to be met by every applicant for permanent 
appointment to any police force in the state.”150  This rule focused 
more on disciplining police than criminals, and coincided with a 
concomitant move to improve the quality  of the criminal process.  
In February 1962, for example, Rockefeller signed a Public 
Defender Bill into law thereby granting counties the authority to 
abandon the practice of assigning counsel for indigent defendants, 
providing instead a Public Defender Service.151   
Rockefeller’s interest in criminal defendants, not just crime 
control, coincided with the growing power of black voters in the 
state.  Throughout the 1950s, black emigrants streamed into New 
York from the South, rapidly transforming the racial demographics 
of urban boroughs like Brooklyn and Queens, and smaller cities 
like Rochester and Newburgh.  Though most African Americans 
had abandoned the Republican Party during the New Deal, black 
anger at Democratic politics in the Deep South following Brown v. 
Board of Education created a window of opportunity for New 
York Republicans to regain their support.152  “A wholesale 
defection by Negro voters could play havoc with Democratic 
prospects in a close election,” asserted the New York Times in 
1956. “By defeating the ticket in such cities as New York, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles,” argued the Times, African Americans 
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voters “might throw each of their respective states into the 
Republican column.”153 
At first, northern Republicans sought black votes primarily 
by promising to improve conditions in the South.154  In June 1958, 
New York Senator and Republican Jacob Javits introduced 
legislation authorizing Federal prosecution and investigation of 
“racially inspired bombings” in the South, partly in response to a 
string of bombings in Florida, Tennessee, and Alabama.155  
Rochester Republican and U.S. Congressman Kenneth B. Keating, 
the same Congressman who accused Averill Harriman of 
cooperating with the Mafia, introduced similar legislation in the 
House.156  Javits continued to support civil rights in the South, 
entering bills calling for federal voting registrars, retention of 
voting records, and making lynching a federal crime in January 
1960.157 
In 1957, northern frustration with southern resistance to 
Brown v. Board of Education led to a Federal Civil Rights Act and 
an ensuing Federal Civil Rights Commission dedicated to studying 
problems of education, voting, and housing in Dixie.158  While the 
Commission found myriad abuses in southern states, it also 
uncovered problems north of the Mason-Dixon line.  In 1959, to 
the delight of many white southerners, the Commission began 
holding hearings on housing and criminal justice in New York 
City.159  There, it uncovered an uncomfortable number of abuses 
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against minorities by landlords and, in a manner that would be 
germane to Governor Rockefeller’s interest in criminal defendants, 
police.160   
At a Commission hearing on February 3, 1959, for 
example, New York Housing Authority Chairman William Reid 
testified that “heavy migration” of African Americans from the 
South into New York “had hindered efforts to obtain and keep a 
racial balance in most of the public housing developments.”161  
Reid’s testimony was augmented by the testimony of former 
Brooklyn Dodger Jackie Robinson who claimed he had moved to 
Stamford, Connecticut because he was unable to find suitable 
housing in New York.162  Several months later, in July 1959, 
Police Commissioner Stephen Kennedy inspired outrage by 
sending police reinforcements into the Brooklyn neighborhood of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant, and the Jamaica section of Queens following 
an incident in which two policemen were shot during an arrest.163  
According to Kennedy, such reinforcements were necessary to 
prevent rioting, a phenomenon that had not hit New York since the 
summer of 1943, when a police officer shot an African American 
soldier.164  Black leaders disagreed, claiming that police brutality 
had become rampant, and that this was just another example of an 
emerging, racially segregated “police state” in New York City.165 
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The Temporary Commission to Revise New York’s Penal 
Law emerged, in part, as a response to such accusations.  The 
Commission was deeply political and heavily Republican, at a 
moment when the Republican Party was struggling to wrest black 
constituents from Democratic hands.166  Members included eight 
prominent New York attorneys, and Herbert Wechsler.167   Though 
less politically active than many of his colleagues, Wechsler 
brought a remarkably pragmatic approach to the task at hand.  In 
fact, during his time on the Commission Wechsler repeatedly 
expressed a concern for negotiating public opinion – and popular 
desires for retribution – lest the overall project fail.  Wechsler 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1980).  Earlier concerns had been half-hearted, at best.  See e.g.  Michael J. 
Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
(2000).  For centuries, popular interest in the criminal justice system had 
revolved more around maintaining the social order, and punishing lawbreakers, 
than upholding individual rights.  For representative works on this theme, see: 
MICHAEL S. HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND 
AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878 (1980); 
EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT N THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); DAVID J. BODENHAMER, THE 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND LAW IN ANTEBELLUM INDIANA (1986); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910 
(1981); DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW (1985); and William E. Nelson, 
Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An 
Historical Perspective, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, EDS. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & HARRY N. 
SCHEIBER 171 (1988). 
166
 The members were selected, perhaps ironically, one day after the Supreme 
Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961).  
167
 Governor Rockefeller, together with Senate Majority Leader Walter J. 
Mahoney and Assembly Speaker Joseph Carlino appointed three members each 
to the commission.  Rockefeller’s appointees included Howard A. Jones, one of 
his assistant counsels, William B. Mahoney, a Buffalo lawyer, and Timothy 
Pfeiffer.  Pfeiffer was well known among lawyers in New York City.  He was a 
former Deputy Attorney General who had prosecuted anti-trust cases against 
unions in the 1920s. Fifty More Indicted in Lockwood Inquiry: Grand Jury 
Finds Bills Against Corporations and Individuals in Heating Business, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1922, at 6; Assembly Speaker Joseph F. Carlino appointed three 
additional members to the Commission.  They were Assemblyman Richard J. 
Bartlett, a lawyer from Glens Falls, Assemblyman William Kapelman, a 
Democrat from the Bronx, and Nicholas Atlas, a New York City attorney.  
Bartlett was later appointed chairman of the Commission by Governor 
Rockefeller.  A graduate of Harvard Law School, he served as a judge advocate 
for the Eighth Fighter Bomber Wing of the Air Force in Korea and was 
discharged in 1953 with the rank of captain. Penal Code Expert: Richard James 
Bartlett, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1965, 37.  Senate Majority leader Walter J. 
Mahoney (William B. Mahoney’s brother) appointed the final three members.  
They were Judge Philip Halpern of Buffalo, John J. Conway, Jr. District 
Attorney of Monroe County, and Herbert Wechsler.   
 30 
 
articulated those views most forcefully in the context of revising 
New York’s laws governing the death penalty.  
 In 1961, New York was the last state in the Union to 
impose a mandatory death penalty for all cases of first degree 
murder.  To Wechsler, any move to alter this required holding 
“public hearings” in order to build popular support for legal 
change.168  Wechsler’s interest in holding hearings reflected a 
democratic strain that ran through much of the commission’s 
proceedings.  For example, at a Commission meeting on December 
8, 1961, Wechsler warned that the “controversial” issue of the 
death penalty presented the Commission with a unique “problem” 
in that public attention to it far outweighed public interest in other 
aspects of the criminal law, notions of culpability, justification, and 
excuse for example.169  To avoid jeopardizing important reforms of 
the entire code, in other words, Wechsler advocated catering to 
popular opinion on the question of the death penalty “so as not to 
impede the progress of a lot of other work that will not be 
controversial.”170  “My own view,” continued Wechsler, “is that a 
careful effort should be made to separate these issues to which the 
public and the legislature are to be really divided.”171   
 In addition to addressing controversial issues discretely, 
Wechsler also suggested the Commission spend time educating the 
public, preparing them for radical changes in the law before those 
changes were actually introduced as legislation.  “This is a[n] 
opportunity,” asserted the Columbia law professor, drawing from 
his early days with the ILD, to “educate the legislature and the 
public and the opportunity should not be lost to educate these two 
groups.”172  In fact, Wechsler took the issue of the death penalty so 
seriously that he suggested spending the entire year on sentencing.  
“This report ought to build up that this year thinking is about 
sentencing,” Wechsler declared, “sentencing which is important to 
the people of the state of New York.”173   
Interestingly, Wechsler counseled against holding actual 
public hearings, suggesting instead that experts or organized 
groups be called, thereby creating forums not for the public to 
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voice its views, but to be educated on the subjects at hand by those 
with either training, institutional knowledge, or experience.  “I am 
against hearings,” he continued, “use available material.  Hearings 
can be used for public relationship reasons.”174  For changes in 
sentencing, he suggested the Commissioner of Correction.175  
Other possible speakers, Wechsler continued, included District 
Attorneys and even clergy.176   
 Wechsler’s suggestion that only experts or authorities be 
called to public hearings coincided with his larger belief that public 
hearings be used not to allow the public to air its concerns, so 
much as to pursue larger, as he put it, “public relationship 
reasons.”  Wechsler’s interest in “public relationship” resonated 
with his interest in public education as a component of the reform 
process.  At every turn he anticipated and sought to preempt a 
potential backlash, knowing that such a backlash could, even if 
focused on only one issue, jeopardize the entire project. This 
reflected a strategic approach to reform, an awareness that 
embedded within the Model Penal Code were myriad reforms, 
many of which did not, and probably would not, attract popular 
scrutiny.  Among these were the elimination of concepts like 
“malignant heart” in favor of more precise, structured 
constructions of mens rea, as well as the simplification of battery 
crimes and reckless conduct. 
 Wechsler voiced some of his concerns about a 
preoccupation with the death penalty ruining other reform 
provisions on November 29, 1962, during the commission’s first 
structured hearing.   The topic of the hearing, held in Albany’s 
Chancellor’s Hall, was a question that Herbert Wechsler had 
suggested, over a month earlier: “Should capital punishment be 
retained, limited, extended or abolished in New York State?”177  
Among those in attendance were Reverend Carl Herman Voss 
from the American League to Abolish Capital Punishment; Joseph 
Ryan, District Attorney for Onandaga County, and Al Sgaglione, 
President of the Police Conference of New York State.   
Out of all the guests who spoke, only Sgaglione supported 
retention of the death penalty in the state.  “The Police Conference 
is opposed to any alteration of capital punishment,” began 
Sgaglione, “because of its great effect as a deterrent.”178  “Penalties 
must be strong,” continued Sgaglione, “As we are all aware today, 
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there is not enough respect for law and order in our great State or 
in our nation.  Therefore, in conclusion, the Police Conference of 
New York respectfully urges this Honorable Commission continue 
the implementation of the mosaic [sic] law: ‘an eye for an eye and 
a tooth for a tooth.’”179   
The commissioners jumped to grill Sgaglione on his claim 
that capital punishment deterred crime.  “[A]s you know perfectly 
well,” began one commissioner, “deliberation can take place in an 
instant.  What I would like to know is when does the man have the 
time to sit down and consider the deterrent of capital punishment, 
in your view?”180  “Possibly after he commits the murder,” 
responded Sgaglione.181  “After he commits the murder, then he 
hasn’t been deterred. Wouldn’t you admit that?”  queried the 
commissioner.182 “He may be deterred from going further, from 
killing a second person or a third murder.  There is always that 
possibility,” responded Sgaglione.183  “Why don’t you favor 
boiling them in oil?” interjected Wechsler.184  “I think our society 
doesn’t believe in that,” responded Sgaglione.185  “I wonder what 
the line of distinction is, as you see it?” continued Wechsler.186  “I 
think – I don’t have the facts with me,” countered Sgaglione, “but 
every so often you read in the papers about someone who is 
released; they have served a number of years for a crime 
committed and they go out and commit a more serious crime.”187  
“You also read about people who served and have been released 
and go out and don’t commit crime,” countered Wechsler.188  
“True,” answered Sgaglione, clearly flailing.189  “You know,” 
continued Wechsler, moving to the importance of discretion in the 
law, “the only state left in the Union – the only jurisdiction in the 
English speaking world that has a mandatory capital punishment is 
New York.  Every other state has changed and you say you are in 
favor of it.”190  “Why do you suppose,” continued Wechsler, “in 
the last 10 years, 15 jurisdictions have given up a mandatory 
capital penalty without any one of them returning to it?  Do you 
think that is an experience you ought to study before you take a 
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position on this question?” concluded Wechsler, relinquishing the 
floor to other Commissioners.191 
 Wechsler’s dialogue with Sgaglione indicated that he did 
not place much faith in deterrence as a legitimate reason for 
continuing the death penalty.  Nor, for that matter, did he agree 
that the death penalty should be mandatory.  Yet, he still believed 
that retribution had utilitarian value.  Evidence of this emerged 
during the testimony of Joseph Ryan, District Attorney for 
Onandaga County, who opposed the penalty.  Ryan began by 
arguing that juries often let killers go free because they themselves 
did not want to be responsible for killing someone.  “The most and 
worst that the death penalty accomplishes today,” maintained 
Ryan, “is to whip up morbid curiosity in trials, creating a 
sensationalism that is based on the primal urge to secure an eye for 
an eye – a tooth for a tooth.”192  Ryan’s claim that the “most” the 
death penalty did was “whip up morbid curiosity” echoed 
Wechsler’s own warnings that execution might brutalize the 
public, as it had done during the Ruth Snyder case.  Ryan’s 
argument that juries sometimes refused to convict because they did 
not want to be implicated in the taking of human life, on the other 
hand, echoed Wechsler’s fear of nullification. 
 However, Wechsler did not agree with Ryan that the death 
penalty should be abolished.  To his mind, keeping the penalty had 
utilitarian value for criminal law, if for no other reason then as a 
prophylactic against legislative backlash.  To press this point, 
Wechsler asked Ryan whether he  “had any real cruel murders in 
the last few years?” hoping to show that if the penalty were 
abolished and a gruesome murder occurred, then voters might call 
for an even more expansive restoration of execution.193  “I don’t 
follow your question,” responded Ryan, “What do you mean?”194  
To illustrate, Wechsler posited a hypothetical.  “Let’s assume a 
confession,” supposed Wechsler, “a documented confession and 
there is no question of who it is in anybody’s mind.  This is a cruel, 
a bitter and unspeakable thing that happened.  Now under present 
circumstances – if you, as the prosecutor, could perhaps make a 
judgment as to whether that was a bad enough case to press for a 
capital verdict, presumably you would take some account of public 
opinion as you appraised it in that situation.”195  Wechsler’s 
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mention of public opinion stemmed from his longstanding interest 
in the relationship between prosecutorial discretion and community 
sentiment, as well as the larger connection between popular 
opinion and legal authority.  It was on this last point that he 
pressed Ryan, asking him “what effect” not being able to go for 
death might have “on public feeling” in cases of particularly cruel 
murders.196 “Would it be a kind of sense of frustration?” wondered 
Wechsler, “enough to incite new legislation?”197  To illustrate, he 
raised the matter of Delaware’s abolition and subsequent 
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1961.198  While forces 
opposing the death penalty succeeded in convincing the legislature 
to do away with execution in 1958, the state continued to sanction 
public flogging as punishment for violent felonies.199  Then, after a 
sensational triple murder one block from the governor’s house in 
1960, the state legislature voted to restore the death penalty, 
eventually overriding a gubernatorial veto to do so.200 “Why?” 
queried Wechsler, “[b]ecause there had been a triple murder and a 
very, very unforgivable condition so that any mitigation was 
negated and just a sense of frustration of the community resulted in 
this sentiment in the legislature.  In other words, I put this question 
to you because it seems to me the issue is trying to judge whether 
abolition is really the most practical proposal to make in this 
situation.”201  Afraid Ryan might not see things quite as 
strategically as he did, Wechsler tried to drive home the counter-
intuitive notion that abolition of the death penalty could hurt 
criminal law generally.  This, ultimately, was its “practical” side, 
its ability to assuage popular anger and legislative backlash.  
 Unable, or perhaps unwilling to see Wechsler’s point, Ryan 
countered by asserting that the death penalty actually had an 
impractical effect, namely that it pressured jurors to reduce first 
degree murder convictions to second, simply to avoid being 
implicated in executions.202    Such a risk would not exist, 
responded Wechsler, if states followed the MPC’s example, 
bifurcating their capital trials and allowing juries to determine guilt 
in one phase and death in another.203 Even if jurors were not 
“unanimous in favor of [the] death penalty,” continued Wechsler, 
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“public opinion” could simply “focus on them,” not the criminal 
code, for perpetrating injustice.204  Under such a scheme, “the most 
you would have is an unpopular verdict,” argued Wechsler, “but in 
an abolition situation, what you have is an outraged populace 
turning to the Legislature and denouncing the law and a very real 
danger that you may end up worse off than you started.”205  
Wechsler’s allusion to being “worse off” alluded to the corruption 
of criminal codes that occurred when elected representatives got 
votes by promising to boost sentences and invent new crimes.  To 
him, this degradation of criminal codes had little to do with the 
inherent nature of the legislative process, but a great deal to do 
with popular desires for revenge stoked by liberal attempts to cabin 
popular will.  
Following the public hearing, the Temporary Commission 
met informally and Wechsler alluded again to Delaware, warning 
that abolition of the penalty could lead to an even more severe 
backlash in favor of it, particularly in the aftermath of a 
particularly brutal killing.  “If the Commission induces the 
Legislature to abolish capital punishment,” noted Wechsler, and if 
thereafter several shocking homicides occur, state lawmakers 
might feel that they were led down the garden path.”206  He 
concluded that the passage of three bills would constitute a 
significant step forward in New York’s reform effort.207  The first 
was a “redefinition of homicide,” abandoning malice aforethought 
for the MPC mens rea of purpose.208  The second was a bifurcation 
of the criminal trial into a “two-stage proceeding” in which the 
jury first decided guilt and then determined the sentence.209  
Finally, Wechsler suggested abandoning the mandatory death 
penalty and allowing prosecutors the discretion to request death.210 
 Wechsler reiterated his fear that abolishing the death 
penalty might lead to a backlash at a second public hearing, also on 
the death penalty held in New York City on December 7, 1962. 
This hearing featured a parade of witnesses, most opposed to the 
penalty.  Among them were Judge Samuel Liebowitz of Kings 
County, Senator Manfred Ohrenstein, Jerome Nathanson, 
representing the New York Committee to Abolish the Death 
Penalty, Norman Redlich, NYU law professor, and Monrad 
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Paulsen, one of Wechsler’s colleagues at Columbia.  “I think that it 
is a very serious mistake for a state to abolish capital punishment 
too soon,” began Paulsen, “even from the point of time of the 
abolitionists.  Because if you succeed by one or two or three votes 
in abolishing capital punishment, what will occur is that an 
outrageous case will come along and the citizens will be affronted 
and the repeal will be repealed.  We have a good many instances of 
that sort in our national history.”211  “A very recent one in 
Delaware?” interjected Wechsler.212  “Yes,” replied Paulsen.213  
Paulsen recommended, as a solution, the MPC’s two-tier system, 
which separated the trial phase from the sentencing phase in capital 
cases.214 
 While Paulsen agreed with Wechsler that abolishing the 
death penalty might lead to a popular backlash, not all the speakers 
concurred.  Myron S. Isaacs of the Urban League of Westchester 
County argued that the penalty should be abolished because it 
discriminated against minorities.  “It is our view that capital 
punishment today is incapable of equitable and impartial 
administration,” maintained Isaacs,  “It represents, in our 
judgment, a cruel concession to vengeance inherited from a time 
when revenge on the offender was a primary aspect of the penal 
code.”215  “Today, it seems to me that among the poor Negroes and 
Puerto Ricans, that they are the principal victims of the death 
penalty in New York.”216 
 Wechsler said nothing.  His silence proved all the more 
remarkable given that the rate of minority executions proved to be 
one of the few aspects of the hearing reported on by the New York 
Times.  “Evidence that Negroes and Puerto Ricans have been the 
principal victims of the death penalty in New York State,” 
observed the Times, “was presented at a legislative hearing here 
yesterday.”217  Wechsler’s silence on black and Hispanic 
executions might have had something to do with his experience 
confronting racial bias in the South.  Minorities, he knew well, 
fared poorly in democratic systems unless they could find a way to 
appeal to majority voters.  Wechsler himself had struggled to open 
up such avenues of appeal in the case of Angelo Herndon almost 
three decades earlier. 
 However, the task that the Temporary Commission faced 
was not protecting minority rights against majority misrule, so 
much as trying to prepare the majority for rational reform.  For this 
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reason, Wechsler showed less interest in disparate treatment data 
than in the testimony of experts like Dr. Hans Kron, Chief of 
Psychiatric Services at Sing Sing Prison.  “If I have to express an 
opinion, the murderer is the least dangerous of criminals,” began 
Kron during the December 7 meeting.218  “The least dangerous?” 
wondered Chairman Bartlett.219  “Yes, a murder is an isolated 
gesture,” continued the French psychiatrist.220  The reasons for 
execution, Kron posited, surprisingly, had less to do with 
deterrence than with popular demand.  “[W]e actually frustrate the 
needs of many people when we will have no more public 
executions,” asserted Kron, referring to the “Roman approach” of 
public punishment for public consumption.221  
 “Do you think that this would cause general neuroses, the 
abolishing of public executions?” wondered Wechsler, reaffirming 
his suspicion that abolishing the death penalty could incite a 
popular backlash.222  “I cannot say,” responded Kron.223  
“Certainly that was a way for people to express their pent-up 
feelings of hostility, their aggressiveness … That is why we cannot 
afford public executions.  We try to make executions humane.  
There is no humane way to kill.  I agree.  I am French by birth . . . 
[and] up to 1929, in France, executions were taking place in public 
. . . the last execution which had taken place in public . . . was a 
homosexual . . . He was executed in Versailles, which is a suburb 
of Paris.  You had these buses around the night clubs of Paris 
picking up people to take them to the execution . . . that will give 
you the idea of the deep meaning of execution.”224 
 Before the death penalty could be abolished, Kron 
continued, echoing Wechsler’s own interest in preparing the public 
for reform, people needed to be educated.  “We have to educate the 
public,” Kron explained to the Commission, “To abolish [the death 
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penalty] immediately, that will be a real revolution.  This is a 
matter of education.”225  Perhaps ironically, Kron saw the manner 
in which execution was conducted in the United States, behind 
prison walls, in a relatively mechanized, impersonal manner, as a 
factor which actually facilitated the administration, and 
continuation of the death penalty.  “[U]nfortunately, when 
executions are exceptions, as they are here, when they are 
accomplished in a very discreet way, with nearly acceptable means 
for many people, when Socrates had to drink the hemlock, that was 
very acceptable, because that is nice, that was a nice death.”226 
 On the day after the December 7 hearing, the Commission 
met again and decided to postpone a decision on whether to 
abolish capital punishment, in large part due to Herbert Wechsler’s 
concerns that it would only jeopardize the larger process of 
reform.227  The Commission did vote, however, in favor of the 
MPC rule advocating separate guilt and penalty phases in capital 
murder trials, with four commissioners, including Wechsler, voting 
in favor.228  Further, the Commission approved much of the MPC’s 
law of homicide, a victory for Wechsler’s strategic approach.229 
 In the Spring of 1965, the legislature voted to adopt a new 
Penal Law for the State of New York.230  It was, in many ways, a 
victory for both Herbert Wechsler and the Model Penal Code.  The 
new law followed the Model Code’s rejection of the M’naghten 
Rule, substituting for it the substantial capacity test.231  It also 
adopted the MPC’s defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a 
broader substitute for the ancient “crime of passion” reducing 
murder to manslaughter.232  Although the new law did not follow 
the Model Penal Code’s lead in abolishing felony murder, it did 
limit it, to the specifically enumerated felonies of robbery, 
burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and 
escape.233  Sodomy, despite the MPC’s suggestion that it be 
decriminalized, remained a crime; as did adultery.  However, there 
was some liberalization.  Married couples were exempted from 
deviate sexual intercourse, and sex offenses could only be proven 
by a corroborating witness.234 
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 Perhaps the biggest liberalization was a move to abolish the 
death penalty.235  In an eight-to-four vote, the Commission 
recommended that the penalty be eliminated in all cases.236  
According to Wechsler, who drafted the report, “the specter of the 
death house” introduced a “morbid and sensational factor” at 
criminal trials, creating the adverse problem of “sympathy for the 
accused.”237  The state legislature agreed, with two exceptions.238  
It abolished the penalty for all defendants except those who killed 
a police officer “acting in the line of duty,” and for convicts 
serving life sentences who murdered a prison guard.239 
   
 
 
 
 
IV: REVENGE RETURNS TO NEW YORK 
 
 For the most part, the Temporary Commission’s close 
attention to popular reception worked, engendering little political 
resistance. “From both sides of the aisle today,” reported the New 
York Times on June 4, 1965, “were applause and lavish praise for 
the commission chairman, Republican Assemblyman Richard J. 
Bartlett.”240  Precisely because the Committee had been careful not 
to offend the public, even granting concessions to avoid backlash, 
it had been able to achieve substantive reform. 
 Yet, the furies of revenge remained.  Despite Wechsler’s 
careful consideration of popular caprice, the Commission’s attempt 
to restrict the death penalty generated a backlash, particularly as 
crime rates began rising in the late 1960s.  In October 1968, a 
legislative committee met in New York to decide whether to 
expand the scope of capital punishment.241  Senator Edward J. 
Speno, the committee chair, announced that “many legislators” in 
New York had received “heavy mail” urging an expansion of cases 
where the penalty applied.242  Much of this mail had been triggered 
by rising crime.243  When New York City Controller Mario 
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Procaccino called for a “get tough” policy on crime during a public 
hearing in Manhattan, including reinstatement of the electric chair 
for murderers, audience members cheered.244  Conversely, “groans 
and cat-calls” inundated psychiatrist Henry Peckstein when he 
warned that “too much repressive legislation” could lead to a 
“fascist state.”245 
 In 1971, state legislators extended capital punishment to 
anyone who killed a corrections officer “while he is performing his 
official duties.”246  In 1973, New York City mayoral candidate 
Mario Biaggi called for the execution of “hired assassins,” “those 
responsible for the killing of a witness to a serious crime,” and 
those who committed murder during a “rape, robbery, or 
kidnapping.”247  In 1977, such a law passed both the House and 
Senate, only to be vetoed by New York Governor Hugh Carey.248  
Four years, and four vetoes later, the issue remained electric, this 
time with New York Mayor and gubernatorial candidate Ed Koch 
declaring that whether the death penalty deterred or not, it “is vital 
that society be allowed to express its moral outrage at wanton 
killing.”249  In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals entered the 
fray and overturned the state’s statute requiring capital punishment 
for offenders who killed while incarcerated, arguing that the 
mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional.250 
 Despite the court’s ruling, popular initiatives to expand the 
death penalty continued into the 1980s.  In 1989, a democratic led 
assembly voted to restore the penalty in cases of murder-for-hire, 
murder of police officers, murder of witnesses, or murder in the 
course of a violent crime.251  Governor Cuomo vetoed the law, 
declaring that even though life had become “ugly and violent” in 
New York, capital punishment constituted little more than an “act 
of vengeance.”252  Frustration with Cuomo’s anti-death penalty 
stance contributed to the 1994 election of George Elmer Pataki, the 
first Republican Governor in twenty years.253  Pataki campaigned 
on a promise to expand the death penalty, something that no New 
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York governor had done since 1977.254  On March 7, 1995, he 
finally succeeded in reinstating the electric chair – three decades 
after the Temporary Commission had tried to eliminate it – with a 
new law creating ten separate instances where death was 
appropriate. 255 
 Just as the political battle seemed over, the courts 
intervened.  In 2004, New York’s highest court invalidated 
Pataki’s law on the grounds that it unconstitutionally pressured 
jurors into choosing the death penalty by warning them that 
offenders who did not get executed might be paroled.256  Though 
Pataki moved quickly to amend the statute, he met stiff resistance 
in the State Assembly, now controlled by Democrats who were 
softening on the issue.257  According to Democratic 
Assemblywoman Helene E. Weinstein, initially a supporter of 
capital punishment, “[m]y vote 10 years ago was 10 years ago.”258  
Since then, argued Weinstein, “new information, important 
information, about DNA testing” and “about innocent people being 
convicted” had emerged, changing her mind.259  Though she did 
not mention the program by name, Weinstein’s allusion to DNA 
testing referred to the Innocence Project, a program founded by 
law professors Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld to show that a 
surprising number of death row inmates were innocent of their 
crimes.260   
 Though Wechsler, who passed away in 2000, would 
undoubtedly have supported the Innocence Project’s work, he 
might also have issued a cautionary note to anyone calling for 
outright abolition of the death penalty.  Based on his own 
experience, death served an important utilitarian, if symbolic, 
function.  By satisfying popular demands for retribution in rare, 
unusually “cruel” cases, it actually limited popular pressures that 
might otherwise result in the degeneration of criminal codes.  Such 
pressures made themselves apparent in the four decades following 
the Temporary Commission’s completion of the Empire State’s 
new Penal Law.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In a recent critique of the Model Penal Code’s sentencing 
revisions, Yale Law Professor James Q. Whitman chastised the 
ALI’s endorsement of retribution as a “distressing failure” in 
criminal law policy.261  “Before we endorse retributivism,” argued 
Whitman, “we need some thoughtfully worked-out understandings 
of its dangers.”262  Among those dangers, continued Whitman, was 
retribution’s synergistic relationship with “harshness” in 
punishment, “propagandistically-minded leaders,” and “mass 
democracy.”263 To Whitman’s mind, “mass democracy” produced 
bad results, led to “the politicization of the crime issue,” and 
should be curtailed.  Declaring “legislative sovereignty” to be at 
the root of America’s penal problems, Whitman called for nothing 
less than the end of popular control of criminal lawmaking, 
handing the system over to “criminal justice professionals.”264 
 Though Wechsler was just the kind of criminal justice 
professional that Whitman suggested, he probably would have 
balked at Whitman’s undemocratic approach.  To him, the dangers 
of retribution paled in comparison to the dangers of rejecting 
democracy, provided that democracy could even be rejected.  At 
least part of Wechsler’s utilitarian endorsement of retribution 
rested on his conviction that democratic majorities would always 
find a way to override, if not eliminate, any kind of politically 
insulated body of “experts” that took control of criminal law and 
sentencing.  Even courts could not fully withstand popular 
pressure, argued Wechsler, noting that judicial bodies jeopardized 
their autonomy when they decided cases that transgressed popular 
will. “Only the maintenance and the improvement” of neutral 
standards of judicial review, argued Wechsler infamously in 1959, 
will protect courts “against the danger of the imputation of a bias 
favoring claims of one kind or another.”265  Once the public 
suspected that courts were biased, then it could demand the 
appointment of new judges, the curtailment of jurisdiction, and 
even the outright rejection of judicial will, all of which Wechsler 
had witnessed in his lifetime.  
 Not only was democratic control over criminal law 
impossible to eliminate, believed Wechsler, but democracy itself 
was worth keeping.  At the heart of all criminal law reform, he 
maintained, should rest the well-being of the community, whose 
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“values and security” are often what is most “disturbed” by 
lawbreaking.266  This means that even if a punishment appears to 
have no deterrent or rehabilitative value, it might still be important 
for easing community outrage, lessening the chances that the 
community will elect politicians even more eager to reverse 
reform. 
   That communities across America have shown themselves 
eager to vote in proponents of new offenses and higher penalties 
does not necessarily mean that retribution should be rejected as a 
matter of sentencing policy.  On the contrary, if the public felt that 
offenses were too numerous or punishments too harsh, then their 
sense of retributive justice would arguably work the opposite way, 
encouraging them to elect representatives intent on reducing 
offenses and lowering punishments, not raising them.  Indeed, this 
is what happened during Prohibition, when states decided to repeal 
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, restoring legality 
to alcohol.  That Wechsler came of age during this period helps 
explain his early fear that retribution might lead to nullification, 
not increased punishment.    
 During his life as a criminal law reformer, Herbert Wechser 
articulated a nuanced rationale for the uses of retribution in 
sentencing, one that reflected a commitment to popular democracy 
and rational reform.267  Recovering this rationale is important, 
particularly given that the tendency over the past two decades has 
been to assume that popular democracy is inherently incapable of 
sustaining reform.  As Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill argue, 
for example, the “degradation” of criminal codes is near inevitable, 
a product of the “inherent nature of the legislative process.”268 This 
is because legislators “share a common reluctance to appear ‘soft 
on crime’” and will therefore support harsher penalties and new 
offenses no matter how “useless or even ridiculous” they may 
be.269 
 Even a cursory look at Herbert Wechsler’s involvement in 
criminal law reform suggests that this is not true.  In New York in 
the first half of the 1960s, for example, there was bipartisan 
support for reforming the state’s criminal code.  There was even 
support for the elimination of certain offenses like adultery and 
fornication.  Salvaging this history is important, if for no other 
reason than to underline the fact that popular attitudes towards 
crime change over time, rendering nothing “inherent” or inevitable.  
Just as the end of adultery was history-specific, reflecting changing 
attitudes towards extra-marital sex, for example, so too is current 
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support for higher penalties against violent felons and sex-
offenders history-specific as well.  While legislators have certainly 
tended to endorse harsher punishments against such offenders over 
the past few decades, this does not necessarily mean that they are 
always afraid of appearing “soft” on crime.  Certainly, they have 
no problem appearing soft on adultery. 
 Assuming that legislative bodies operate mechanistically 
against reform ignores history and leads to undemocratic results.  
According to some criminal law scholars for example, the answer 
to the degradation of criminal codes is to shift discretion away 
from legislators and to “experts.”270  For others, the solution to the 
“pathological politics” of criminal law is to abolish “legislative 
supremacy” by shifting crime definition from legislatures to 
courts.271 
 Instead of crippling democracy, why not look to the root 
causes of crime, or to improving law enforcement?  Criminologists 
agree that offenders are much more likely to be deterred from 
committing crime based on the likelihood of arrest, not sentence 
length.272  This means that whether sentences are long or short may 
actually be irrelevant to crime control – and academic calls for 
undermining democracy misplaced.  Perhaps scholars should focus 
more on the development of more effective policing technologies, 
not robbing legislatures of their authority.   
 Along similar lines, perhaps the high number of 
incarcerations in the United States is more related to poverty, racial 
segregation, and the failure of urban public schools than to 
retributive sentencing schemes.  Given that one in nine black males 
between the ages of 20 and 34 is incarcerated, claims by scholars 
like David Singleton and Augustina Reyes that there is in fact a 
school to prison “pipeline” in less-affluent black communities 
suggests that school-centered reform, not sentencing, might be the 
appropriate locus for legal change.273  Here, policies like those 
being employed by District of Columbia Public School Chancellor 
Michelle Rhee, together with the enhancement of truancy laws, 
removal of summer break, and extension of school hours might do 
more to reduce crime than tinkering with sentencing terms.274  
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 Finally, why not re-imagine punishment?  Incarceration, 
though dominant in America today, is only one manifestation of 
many possible forms of sentencing.  Both shaming and restitution, 
for example, hold the potential to satisfy community outrage just 
as effectively as incarceration, particularly if backed by popular 
support.275  Even if criminal law reformers do not have a taste for 
such moves, they would do well to remember Wechsler’s rationale 
behind the uses of revenge, and support the ALI’s recent revision 
of the Model Penal Code’s sentencing provisions. 
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